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ABSTRACT: In this paper, it is argued that both the informer and the hearer in a testimonial situation deserve epis-
temic merit insofar as they contribute to the collaborative achievement of sharing knowledge. The paper in-
troduces a distinction between the ideals of self-sufficiency and epistemic autonomy. The autonomous ex-
ercise of our epistemic agency is very often carried out under strong conditions of epistemic dependence. 
Testimony exhibits a kind of social dependence that does not threaten the autonomy of the subjects that 
need to consider their own epistemic capacities. When involved in a testimonial situation, both speaker and 
hearer declare, at least implicitly, the standings they occupy in an epistemic space and are obliged to recog-
nise certain epistemic requirements. 
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1 
The Kantian Maxim “Think for oneself” represents the enlightened ideal of an 
autonomous intellectual life. The maxim requires of the autonomous subjects to take 
into charge their doxastic acts. In order to do so, they should carefully examine the ra-
tional support of their believings and disbelievings. At the same time, the ideal seems 
to be committed to a certain version of epistemological individualism. The seat of 
knowledge is the individual agent that considers and reflects about the rational 
grounds of his beliefs. But what about beliefs acquired by testimony? Testimonies 
taken at face value seem to threaten intellectual autonomy. To defer to other’s author-
ity entails to relinquish our epistemic responsibilities. To accept uncritically testimo-
nies would infest our minds with old prejudices, arbitrary opinions, and false beliefs. 
 In this paper, I wish to introduce some distinctions that allow us to establish that 
the acquisition of knowledge by testimony does not affect to what I will call the epis-
temic autonomy of the agents. I do not equate the notions of intellectual and epis-
temic autonomy; but this is not the distinction I wish to pay attention to. Some ver-
sions of individualism promote the constitution of self-sufficient epistemic agents. In 
a sense, when we include testimony as a basic source of knowledge acquisition, it is 
the individualist ideal of epistemic self-sufficiency that is challenged, not the epistemic 
autonomy of an agent who exerts his competences in a testimonial situation. 
 I will introduce this distinction in the context of a recent discussion about the kind 
of merit the epistemic agent would deserve when she accepts others’ words. Many vir-
tue epistemologists have recently pointed to the close link between knowledge ascrip-
tions and credit attribution when acquiring a true belief. Insofar as knowing is viewed 
as a certain achievement by the virtuous agent, he seems to deserve epistemic merit. 
This achievement is understood, within virtue epistemology, as the outcome of an ex-
ercise of certain epistemic dispositions; and the true belief that amounts to knowledge 
is due to this exercise. 
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 But there is a powerful objection against such views of knowledge: it is easy to 
identify cases in which one acquires knowledge by testimony without credit attribu-
tion. Does the receiver of a testimony contribute, in any relevant sense, to the correct-
ness of the acquired belief? If the correctness of the belief crucially depends on the tes-
tifier, at least regarding what is epistemically significant, then it does not seem that the 
receiver contribute in any significant way that would justify credit attribution. My di-
agnosis of the problem will be that the epistemic dependence displayed in this kind of 
situations does not threaten the agential condition that gives some sense to the auton-
omy of the epistemic subjects involved in the testimonial act. 
 I will propose that testimony results in an epistemic achievement which all the par-
ticipants deserve epistemic credit for. Given that this achievement is only possible be-
cause of the interdependence displayed by both speaker and hearer, the merit will de-
pend on the respective epistemic contributions of each participant. I will also suggest 
that it is mistaken to think about epistemic agency under the idea that an individual 
has to be self-sufficient in assessing what supports the correctness of a certain belief, 
because there could be many significant aspects in a given situation that escape the 
control and accountability of the subject. So it is reasonable to introduce the distinc-
tion I mentioned above: autonomy (as opposed to heteronomy) is not equivalent to 
self-sufficiency (as opposed to dependence). Therefore, it is possible to conceive of a 
situation in which a subject exerts her epistemic autonomy under conditions of epis-
temic dependence. This is so in testimonial cases. 
 I will proceed in the following way. First, I will present the challenge that Jennifer 
Lackey has introduced against what she calls the Deserving Credit View of Knowledge 
(Lackey 2007). I will discuss, secondly, several possibilities of defense of the idea that 
in testimonial cases the knower (receiver of testimony) also deserves credit. I will then 
describe the testimonial situation as that in which the receiver adopts a certain epis-
temic perspective. I will end with my own diagnosis about Lackey’s challenge and pre-
sent briefly the distinction between epistemic autonomy and self-sufficiency. 
2 
In this paper, I adopt the framework of a virtue epistemology: knower’s achievements 
are to be assessed not only in terms of the acquisition of true beliefs but also in terms of 
how the agent gets the truth. A virtue theory accounts for the correctness of our belief as 
due to the epistemic competences (virtues) of the subject. To this extent, the correctness 
of the belief is attributable to the knower and she deserves a certain credit for her 
achievement.1 The fundamental values governing our epistemic performance cannot be 
reduced to the systematic connection to the truth; the subject is concerned with how the 
truth is attained. There is a merit attributable to the agent that depends on the success 
                                                     
1 In this paper, I will use interchangeably the notions of credit and merit. I am going to assume that those 
acts worthy of credit or merit reflect assessments of praise and blame. Nevertheless, I don’t think one 
should also be committed to the idea that those acts creditable to the subject have also to be account-
able to the subject. The agent is not required to be able to account responsibly for her achievements in 
order to be worthy of praise and blame in the sense I am using the terms in this paper. 
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being the result of the exercise of an epistemic virtue. How truth is attained due to a 
competence of the epistemic agent adds some value to the true belief and makes the 
subject worthy of merit. In some theories, to the extent that the acquisition of a true be-
lief excludes some kinds of luck, the true belief amounts to knowledge. 
 Consider the following quotations: “We do not want just the truth that is given to us 
by happenstance, or by some alien agency, where we are given a belief that hits the mark 
of truth not through our own performance, not through any accomplishment creditable 
to us” (Sosa 2003, p. 174). Or Greco about how to understand knowledge attributions: 
“one of the central functions of knowledge attributions is to give credit for true belief. 
When we say that S knows p, we imply that it is not just an accident that S believes the 
truth with respect to p... We mean to say that getting it right can be put down to S’s own 
abilities, rather than to dumb luck, or blind change, or something else” (Greco 2003, p. 
116). The idea in these quotations is the following: the normative status that is constitu-
tive of knowledge is the status that makes the knower creditable. 
 Jennifer Lackey, in a recent paper, characterizes in the following way what she calls 
the Deserving Credit View of Knowledge (DCVK): 
CREDIT: If S knows that p, then S deserves credit for truly believing that p. 
DIFFERENCE: The central epistemic difference between knowing that p and S truly believing that 
q merely by luck is the credit that S deserves for truly believing that p, but lacks for truly believing 
that q. 
VALUE: The additional value that S’s knowing that p has over S’s truly believing that q merely by 
luck is the credit that S deserves for truly believing that p and lacks for truly believing that q. 
(Lackey 2007, p. 346) 
 Lackey argues that this account is mistaken because there are cases in which we are 
disposed to attribute knowledge without being so disposed to consider that the subject 
is creditable in any relevant sense. Her decisive case against this view appeals to a basic 
testimonial situation. As I have said, the idea behind credit attribution has to do with 
the epistemic competences of the subject playing a role in accounting for the correctness 
of the belief that p when the belief is true. But in testimonial cases, which is the con-
tribution of the receiver’s competences to the explanation of the correctness of the 
belief? Lackey’s challenge is couched in common cases like the following: 
Having just arrived at the train station in Chicago, Morris wishes to obtain directions to the Sears 
Tower. He looks around, approaches the first adult passer-by that he sees, and asks how to get to 
his desired destination. The passer-by, who happens to be a Chicago resident who knows the city 
extraordinarily well, provides Morris with impeccable directions to the Sears Towers by telling 
him that it is located two blocks east of the train station. Morris unhesitatingly forms the corre-
sponding true belief. (Lackey 2007, p. 352) 
 Lackey’s argument is straightforward: whichever is the merit attributable in this 
situation, it is to the informer that is due and not to the receiver. The epistemic value 
of the belief acquired, when true, does not depend on the cognitive resources of the re-
ceiver, but of the informer. So Lackey draws the following conclusion: 
because of testimonial knowledge’s unique dependency on the cognitive resources of someone other than the 
subject in question, what often does shoulder this explanatory burden are the faculties of someone 
other than the knower herself. (Lackey 2007, p. 356) 
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 Only the competences of the testifier seem to be involved in a causal account of 
why it is correct the belief acquired by the hearer. The epistemic aspect of the achieve-
ment is due to the informer. The receiver acquires knowledge by testimony, but he 
does not deserve any epistemic credit for it. So the DCVK is wrong. 
 Lackey takes the case to be a rebuttal of the DCVK. I do not intend to challenge 
this rebuttal. This would require to give necessary and sufficient conditions for knowl-
edge attribution that would also allow us to exclude Gettier cases. And I do not want 
to discuss if merit attribution is enough to account for the value of knowledge over 
true belief. I am only interested in arguing that, if a receiver of a testimony acquires 
knowledge, it is also true that he deserves some credit for it. In principle, I will argue, 
there is nothing that suggest that knowledge attributions in testimonial cases are totally 
independent of merit attribution. 
3 
Let me briefly examine some possible responses to Lackey’s challenge. The first one is 
introduced and answered by Lackey herself. Morris’ case is compatible with a reduc-
tionist account of testimonial knowledge. According to reductionism, testimony by it-
self does not provide any ground for the acceptance of others’ words. A certain posi-
tive support is needed if one wish to secure the obtaining of knowledge by testimony. 
That means that only if you assume a non-reductionist account on testimony, according 
to which testimony by itself represents a basic source of knowledge, it makes sense 
not to regard the receiver as worthy of credit.  
 Nonetheless, I think that Lackey is right in claiming that the significance of this 
case has nothing to do with the confrontation between reductionists and non-
reductionists. The problem doesn’t disappear simply by assuming that the epistemic 
merit of the hearer is grounded on the positive reasons she has for accepting others’ 
testimony, as the reductionist claims. It is true that the hearer must have general 
knowledge of human psychology and the situation she is in order to motivate the pos-
session of positive reasons to accept the report. But this is not the crucial point in dis-
cussion. What is important is that these reasons would not explain why Morris’ belief is 
correct. They would just explain why someone like Morris would accept any testimony 
in the circumstances (Lackey 2007). The debate between reductionists and non-
reductionists cannot just be about whether in fact the acceptance of a testimony is sup-
ported or not by certain reasons concerning the reliability of the informer. The ques-
tion is rather whether testimony is a non-reducible epistemic source, that is, whether it 
provides a positive and proper contribution in the acquisition of knowledge, without requir-
ing that testimonial support be completely independent of other rational considerations 
and information coming from other sources (Lackey 2006). What it is really at stake is 
what kind of understanding we have of the effective contribution of the hearer in ac-
counting for the correctness of the belief acquired. And one does not need to assume 
that non-reductionists do not care about the role played by the hearer at all. 
 Secondly, one could attempt to rebut Lackey’s objection by questioning the intui-
tions behind Morris’ case. One way of doing it would consist in denying that Morris 
acquires knowledge. He is acquiring instead a true belief enabling him to get the Sears 
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Tower. Morris seems to trust the informer and act according to the confidence he has 
in him. But if someone will challenge his belief, his doxastic commitment would be 
quickly undermined. The value attributable to the belief would depend on the truth of 
the belief, and perhaps the value of the belief is rather constituted by the practical 
consequences than by the epistemic support the belief has for Morris. 
 Doubtless, Morris seeks to have some confidence in the reliability of the informer 
and considers that it could be a good way of acquiring knowledge. Practical success is 
supported by the fact that some knowledge is transmitted from the speaker to the 
hearer. But Plato’s Meno had shown that for practical success true belief could be 
equally valuable as knowledge. In any case, there is no reason not to assume that the 
receiver is entitled to his belief that p by the fact that the testifier has assured him that 
p, even if the speaker could be misinformed or insincere. In a sufficiently good situa-
tion, this entitlement would amount to knowledge. So Lackey’s challenge would be in 
place. What is the contribution of the receiver to the epistemic achievement in a tes-
timonial situation? 
 Another way of questioning the intuitions would be to doubt whether it is really a 
case of testimony and, by extension, a case of acquisition of testimonial knowledge. 
We could distinguish between mere cases of transmission of information by social 
means and cases of genuine testimony. Our social world is plenty of mechanisms for 
spreading information. But only some situations where information is socially chan-
neled are cases of testimony. In testimonial exchanges, a kind of epistemic coopera-
tion between speaker and hearer is taking place, in which both participants are com-
mitted to preserve the adequate epistemic conditions for the hearer to acquire a true 
belief. Does Morris’ case represent a situation in which an epistemic cooperation is ac-
tually taking place? That will depend on how we describe the situation. In principle, 
the fact that the speaker is intending to fill Morris’ epistemic demands and the hearer 
is taking others’ words as prima facie entitling him to acquire the belief supports the 
idea that Morris is engaged in a cooperative situation where a genuine epistemic ex-
change is taking place. So Morris’ case is a basic case of epistemic cooperation and 
Morris acquires knowledge by testimony. 
 A third strategy will provide more positive answers to the challenge. Something posi-
tive must be said about the competences that would ground Morris’ contribution to the 
correctness of the belief he is acquiring by testimony. The simplest way of doing it is by 
recognising the exercise by the hearer of a certain social competence. Testimonial acqui-
sition of knowledge would be an achievement of the subject because the hearer exerts 
his competences and it is in virtue of this exercise that he acquires a correct belief. This 
strategy needs to say something else about the competence that is being exerted. In 
principle, it could be (i) a competence closely linked with our communicative abilities 
and our capacities of mind-reading. (ii) We could also suppose that the competence is a 
kind of social “monitoring” that help us to discriminate epistemic collaborators from 
non-collaborators. In our social life, we have acquired certain dispositions to trust and 
distrust people and we have learned several facts about what kinds of sources are credi-
ble or not. But if it is a mere interpretative competence, in what sense is epistemic merit 
attributable to the hearer? And if, on the contrary, it is a social competence for discrimi-
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nating epistemic behavior, it is nor clear that Morris is exerting it. Morris does not judge 
at any moment about the trustworthiness or the competence of the informer. He does 
not seem to ground his acceptance on the exercise of a “monitoring” competence that 
enables him to discriminate trustworthy informers. 
 A fourth response could be couched in the following terms: in testimonial cases, 
achievements are just partially attributable to the hearer insofar as his competence is 
“socially seated” (Sosa 2007, p. 93). We don’t need to suppose that there is a social 
unit that possesses the competence; it suffices with identifying the joint effort of 
speaker and hearer in accounting for how the hearer acquires a true belief from the 
speaker’s words. In a sense, credit corresponds to the group competence, but there is 
another sense in which the individual obtains a partial credit: “The correctness of 
one’s belief is still attributable in part to a competence seated in oneself individually” 
(Sosa 2007, p. 95). But if there is an individual contribution to the success insofar as it 
is grounded in the exercise of a competence “socially seated”, what is this contribu-
tion? Does it require a new individual competence? How does the competence seated 
individually contribute to the success of the testimonial act? 
 One possible suggestion is to require that the hearer be a reliable receiver of testi-
mony (Greco 2007). Only in cases in which belief is the outcome of hearer’s activity, 
we are entitled to attribute knowledge (and epistemic credit). Thus the question trades 
again on the intuitions about Morris’ case. Lackey is confident that Morris acquires 
knowledge by testimony even if he chooses the first passer-by coming, that is, without 
engaging in any discriminatory activity which could support the idea of him as a reli-
able receiver of testimony. Is Morris involved in the correct way in order to deserve 
some credit? (Greco 2007). 
 Greco introduces an analogy with a football game in order to clarify the situation and 
not trade too much on the intuitions. A player receiving a pass which is worthy of merit 
because of its difficulty and beauty also deserves some credit for just scoring. As I have 
said, credit is deserved in a collective game, and depends on the abilities of each partici-
pant. So, not all credit, not all the epistemically relevant contribution, belongs to the in-
former (or the player passing the ball); the hearer, even if he just “catches” the words 
and scores, does contribute significantly to the success. What is excluded is a mere situa-
tion of scoring by luck. But I do not think that the analogy helps to clarify what Greco 
means by a “correct way” of accepting a testimony. He appeals to the fulfilling of the 
goals of the game. In the testimonial case, the receiver exerts the abilities that serve the 
purposes of practical reasoning. But this cannot be the last word, because why should 
not we suppose again that true beliefs could play the same practical role? 
 Two ideas I would like to retain from this discussion. First, it is necessary to ac-
knowledge that the receiver is worthy of partial credit for his beliefs when it is a ques-
tion of contributing to a cooperative effort. Second, if the hearer deserves credit in 
testimonial cases, it is so because the correctness of the belief is also attributable to a 
hearer’s competence. But if it is so, one needs to specify what kind of epistemic com-
petences the receiver is exerting. Otherwise, intuitions about credit attribution would 
be called into question again. 
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This section briefly presents what I understand by a successful testimonial act. Testi-
mony is a cooperative epistemic achievement. A virtuous process of knowledge acqui-
sition by testimony requires the preservation of a social bond with a certain epistemic 
import (Broncano 2008). A testimonial act does not merely consist in extracting in-
formation from a social source. It requires that the participants exhibit a certain sensi-
tivity to the epistemic conditions in which they are involved, in such a way that suc-
cess be due to the interdependence created among the participants. So merit attribu-
tion cannot be but the outcome of this interdependence. A part of the merit corre-
sponds then to the receiver of the information. 
 The specific contribution of the hearer has to be viewed in the context of the co-
operation of both participants, insofar as they exhibit their respective condition of 
epistemic agents. They adopt first a perspective regarding to their own epistemic 
standings. And secondly they help to create a situation in which they have to recognise 
mutual epistemic responsibilities. Both participants generate and exhibit genuinely 
epistemic attitudes contributing to the success of the testimonial act. What we are in-
terested in is the characteristic epistemic contribution of the receiver to the success of 
the testimonial act, that is, his contribution in terms of the exercise of his own compe-
tences. In order to explain it, I need to say more about what I understand by perspec-
tive-taking and generation of mutual responsibilities. 
 Perspective-taking is an attitude by which the subject shows a certain sensitivity to 
the position he occupies in the epistemic space. The subject’s capacity of perspective-
taking also involves the possibility of tracking the changes in the epistemic positions 
that are relevant to his epistemic life. Taking a perspective is a basic competence in our 
epistemic life, a competence that enables us to “manage” our epistemic standings in a 
space of interacting epistemic agents. Nonetheless, the exercise of this capacity does 
not need to be explicitly exhibited. 
 The idea of the creation of mutual responsibilities depends on how each participant ex-
changes epistemic claims in the testimonial situation. Let us review these exchanges briefly: 
a) Who asks for information adopts and recognises an epistemic standing which 
claims of the testifier a certain attitude. This epistemic standing is characterised by a 
situation of epistemic dependence at least in two dimensions, a dimension of epis-
temic poverty and a dimension of epistemic fragility. Who asks for information avows 
and declares that he wants that the other knows that he depends on his position re-
garding a certain proposition p (Broncano 2008). In doing so, he assumes that the as-
sertion of the testifier would and should be backed by reasons he does not possess. We 
don’t need to suppose that the only way he would be entitled to accept the testimonial 
belief as true would have to be supported by evidential reasons that he could have ei-
ther for the truth or falsity of the proposition or for the credibility of the informer, as 
if only by the acquisition of these evidences the testimony could have epistemic value. 
In fact, what it happens is that by adopting different epistemic standings, a situation is 
created in which the receiver himself shows that he will adopt an epistemic attitude of 
trust towards the other’s words. In testimonial situations, there is involved an irreduci-
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ble epistemic dimension that goes beyond the positive evidential support of the be-
liefs, and this dimension is manifested as the recognition by the participants that some 
epistemic positions effectively depend on the lack of reasons. 
b) The informer on her side, insofar as she acknowledges the demands of a coopera-
tive epistemic act, adopts an attitude in which she recognises the claims the other is 
making and the situation of epistemic authority he is in. In parallel to dependence, 
epistemic authority is characterised by the two contrasting dimensions of epistemic 
richness and epistemic strength. Who testifies for or against p recognises that the other 
depends on him to know that p and, because of that, he decides to endorse p (or not) 
through his assertion. It is also true that he must be sensitive to the lack of reasons of 
the receiver and the epistemic situation he is in. Hearer and informer exhibit their re-
spective sensitivity to the lack of reasons of the hearer and the asymmetrical situation 
of authority/dependence created. 
 Morris’ case belongs to a category of cases in which one seems to assume that only 
evidential factors for the belief are involved in epistemic evaluations deserving some 
merit. In Morris’ case, the ground for acquiring the belief is not the evidence he pos-
sesses but the evidential reasons of the other, reasons that are not necessarily made ex-
plicit in the communicative exchange. So testimonial transmission of knowledge can-
not be accounted exclusively in terms of the evidence available to the participants. As 
I have tried to suggest, it is the epistemic trust the receiver places on the informer 
(who at his turn has implicitly acknowledged the situation they are in) that contributes 
significantly to the success of the testimonial act.2 
 Now it is easier to explain the contribution of the hearer to the correctness of the be-
lief he acquires by testimony. First, insofar as the testifier and the receiver share knowledge, 
success in testimony is not accountable in individualistic terms. It would be wrong to 
suppose that merit could be distributed among the participants in such a way that the 
merit of the hearer is insignificant compared with the merit of the speaker. But even if a 
distribution is possible, yet success, as I have said, is due to the interdependence of both 
participants. Merit in testimony is attributable to an epistemic cooperative act; so it has 
to be attributable to both participants, if it is attributable to any of them.  
 Is the contribution of the hearer epistemic? Sure, it is. Competences exercised in the 
testimonial situation reflect the dispositions of the subject regarding the truth of the beliefs 
she acquires. Both speaker and hearer declare, at least in an implicit way, the standings they 
occupy in an epistemic space. And both of them contribute to generate a situation under 
which they are obliged to acknowledge certain epistemic requirements. Briefly, success is 
due to the exercise of the relevant epistemic competences of both participants. And merit 
attribution depends on how each participant puts into play his own epistemic agency. 
                                                     
2 Other papers in this volume emphasize appropriately the role played by trust in testimony. See Bron-
cano 2008 and Origgi 2008. The recent proposal by Richard Moran (2006) suggests that trust is not 
placed primarily in the proposition believed but in the person that assures the hearer that the world is 
like he claims to be. Obviously, the notion of trust can do its job in this context only if we suppose 
that it is not just the result of a mere calculus of rational expectations about the behaviour of other 
epistemic agents. If it were so, we will be faced again with an evidentialist conception. 
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How does merit attribution depend on exercising epistemic agency in testimonial 
cases? One possible objection to this line of reasoning comes from recognising that 
testimony massively depends on resources external to the subject, and that this is enough 
to “swamp” any contribution of the competences of the receiver to the correctness of 
the belief acquired, and consequently challenge the attribution of merit. Is not a testi-
monial case like a situation in which factors outside the control of the subject “force” 
the acquisition of a true belief, even in a very reliable way? Lackey reminds us a classi-
cal virus’ case in which the subject seems to acquire knowledge, though the belief is 
produced by the work of a highly reliable virus. It is true that in this kind of cases one 
would not be tempted to attribute any merit to the subject. So the issue is independent 
of the testimonial case. In general, when those aspects that contribute to explain the 
acquisition of knowledge are external to the agent, then merit attributions do not have 
any sense. And it seems also true that we can identify cases of knowledge where the 
relevant features to decide whether there is knowledge or not goes “beyond the scope 
of anyone’s reflective perspective” (Sosa 2006, p. 116). 
 If we can identify epistemic “achievements” under these conditions, then Lackey’s 
challenge seems definitive because there is no prospect for attributing credit. Besides, in 
answering the challenge, a too easy attribution of merit has to be avoided. Sometimes, in 
current language, we attribute blame (it is not so in cases of praise) when we identify 
some defects (not so easily in cases of identifying some perfections) in something or 
someone. If we would ground our notion of epistemic merit in attributions where we 
judge the perfection or defect of something or someone, to get some merit would be 
very easy. On the other side, I do not think that this caution entails that merit attribution 
makes sense only when the subject is fully responsible, that is, only when the subject can 
account before other people for his deeds. There is a possible middle ground to secure 
merit attribution, at least in epistemic matters. The theory of virtues makes merit attribu-
tion dependent on the evaluation of the agents to the extent that they exert their epis-
temic competences and abilities. Nothing prevents that doxastic agency be exerted un-
der conditions which are not directly accessible to the voluntary control of the subject.  
 Testimony is not like the virus’ case. In this last case, what explains that we are not 
disposed to attribute any merit is that perhaps there is no genuine epistemic agency 
involved. And consequently, it would be difficult to ascribe any knowledge. I do not 
want to trade on the intuitions, but it seems obvious to me that there is a minimal 
condition present in the testimonial case that is absent in the virus’ case, a condition 
that I would call of attributability to the agent. Despite some external features playing 
a significant role in the receiver’s acquisition of a true belief in testimony, it is also true 
that this does not affect to his condition of epistemic agent that exerts his own com-
petences. In other words, the condition of attributability is not just tied to a require-
ment of responsible control of our beliefs. And, at the same time, I take this condition 
to be sufficient for merit attribution to the extent that beliefs are the outcome of the 
exercise of agent’s capacities that are normatively stable. 
 In our explanation of what an achievement of an agent is, epistemic evaluations de-
pend on how the agent himself is constituted. If a decisive dependence on external 
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factors would make unavailable the attribution of merit, then we could hardly explain 
how knowledge acquisition is in general a normative achievement. Only when these 
external factors affect to the identity of the epistemic agent, it is legitimate to raise 
some doubts about whether we should or not attribute merit. Merit depends on 
agency, and agency can be exerted under conditions of epistemic dependence on other 
epistemic agents. The value of testimony is dependent on the participants putting ade-
quately into play their competences, because otherwise the cooperative success we 
have talked about would not take place. 
 The notion of knowledge as the achievement of an epistemic agent also serves to 
draw our attention towards the notion of epistemic autonomy, a notion that I will 
distinguish from a dubious ideal of epistemic self-sufficiency. 
 Remember again the tension raised by the attempts to include testimony within the 
basic sources of knowledge. On the one hand, there is a fully motivated fear that the 
subject will be tied to poor and even erroneous beliefs because of having adopted a 
questionable attitude of gullibility towards others’ words. The Enlightenment ideal is 
the reflection of this fear. In order to escape credulity and the attractive of grounding 
our beliefs in dubious authorities, the maxim imposes to examine with puritan rigour 
any received belief. The maxim “Think for oneself” turns into the highest value of an 
autonomous intellectual life. Testimony, without rational guide, could place the agent in 
risky epistemological conditions. But, on the other hand, there is also a well motivated 
fear of falling into an extreme epistemic individualism that would threaten testimony 
as a basic source of knowledge and would not care enough about the social conditions 
of knowledge production and transmission. 
 I think this tension begins to loosen if we introduce a distinction between autonomy 
and self-sufficiency in epistemic matters. Elisabeth Fricker characterises in these terms 
what she calls an “autonomous” knower, and I will call a “self-sufficient” epistemic agent. 
This ideal type relies on no one else for any of her knowledge. Thus she takes no one else’s word for 
anything, but accepts only what she has found out for herself, relying only on her own cognitive 
faculties and investigative and inferential powers... The wholly autonomous knower will not accept 
any proposition, unless she herself possesses the evidence establishing it. (Fricker 2006, p. 225) 
 A self-sufficient epistemic agent only accepts a belief if it is supported by the evi-
dence available from his own point of view. This ideal looks for the development of a 
purely individualistic epistemology: a self-sufficient knower is an individual knower. 
What kind of agent is promoted by this ideal? An agent that would encourage an atti-
tude of suspicion in all those cases where we should defer our epistemic decisions to oth-
ers. But a systematic attitude of suspicion would be highly irrational, mainly because it 
would affect to our own condition as epistemic agents. It would make more likely to 
have paranoid agents, diminished in his own epistemic capacities. I am supposing that, 
in a certain sense, a condition of epistemic dependence is significant for the adequate exercise 
of our epistemic agency. This idea could have two different readings which I would like 
to mention briefly: first, it could mean that it is part of our constitution as epistemic 
agents to be subject to conditions of epistemic dependence; second, it could simply 
mean that situations of epistemic dependence in cases of testimony are fully compatible 
with the exercise of our epistemic agency. This last condition is sufficient for running 
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my argument, though it is clear to me that the choice between both interpretations could 
have decisive consequences for the project of a social epistemology. 
 My claim is that there is a notion of epistemic autonomy, orthogonal to the ideal of self-
sufficiency, that contrasts less with the idea of dependence than with the notion of heter-
onomy. The terminology has a Kantian flavour at this point. I don’t have space to enter 
into the details of different conceptions on autonomy, but I will add some provisional 
notes about it. I don’t need to take “autonomy” as a capacity of self-legislation in Kant-
ian terms. There is a notion of autonomy that could be derived from a certain theory of 
virtues, according to which an epistemic agent is autonomous if he reveals certain as-
pects of his identity through his own acts.3 I think that at least two dimensions are 
clearly involved in a characterisation of epistemic autonomy in these terms.  
 First, it is necessary to suppose a certain stability and appropriate integration of the 
knower’s faculties and competences. An epistemic subject cannot be a mere bunch of 
faculties, even if they are highly reliable. In order to attribute virtues leading to knowl-
edge, we need to suppose that the subject is appropriately constituted and is able to 
put jointly into work all his epistemic competences. This dimension of the autonomy 
explains how the subject is entitled to exert the appropriate abilities to form beliefs 
and how this fact contributes to the success in his epistemic activity. 
 Second, the agent must be able to adopt a certain epistemic standing towards his 
own achievements. He must be able to take himself as a knower that weights his own 
abilities in each epistemic situation he is involved in. It is a normative fact of our epis-
temic constitution that we are sensitive to this condition of being a knower. In a cer-
tain sense, this dimension recovers the Kantian intuition that, as cognitive beings, we 
also act by the conception we have of our own epistemic condition, even if we are not 
legislators governed by an epistemic rational will.  
 As I have said, this notion of autonomy does not contrast with a notion of depend-
ence, but with a notion of heteronomy. An epistemic subject could be affected in what en-
titles him to make a good use of his faculties and in what allows him to adequately regard 
his condition as epistemic agent. An heteronomous condition is brought about when cer-
tain aspects in the epistemic life of the agent prevents him from constituting himself ap-
propriately as a knower, both at the level of the integration and stability of his faculties and 
competences and at the level of the perspective-taking on his own activity. The way others 
see and judge our epistemic work, for instance, could bring about conditions of heteron-
omy for the subject. Prejudices or attacks against the confidence we place in the exercise 
of our faculties can cause severe defects in our epistemic performance. 
                                                     
3 Let us add before leaving this question a brief remark about the contrast between the self-sufficiency 
ideal and the autonomy of an epistemic agent. It is not just a question about the respective impor-
tance of the seeking of evidence for assessing others’ assertions. Obviously, a self-sufficient epistemic 
agent could yet defer to others’ words, but the significance of this deference is explained in terms of a 
general attitude of suspicion. As expression of her epistemic identity, this attitude would tend to chal-
lenge continuously the value of deferring to others. That means also that autonomy —and the ade-
quate exercise of epistemic agency in deferring to others— does not depend on taking others’ words 
as authoritative just when sufficient evidential considerations are available. I would like to thank an 
anonymous referee for pressing this kind of questions. 
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I have argued that informer and receiver in a testimonial situation are worthy of epis-
temic merit because of their collaborative achievement. To see that, it is enough to ac-
knowledge that they are involved in the situation as full epistemic agents. They seek to 
share some knowledge. The condition of agency secures a certain attributability of the 
acts. There is no danger in including testimony within our basic sources of knowledge; 
the enlightened ideal of an autonomous epistemic inquiry is preserved, once we distin-
guish between the ideal of self-sufficiency and the exercise of autonomy tied to our 
achievements. Part of the epistemic merit we deserve as knowers is accounted in 
terms of the autonomous exercise of our epistemic agency. And this agency is very of-
ten carried out under strong conditions of epistemic dependence. So it is in the case of 
testimony. 
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